• Order Independence in Sequential, Issue-by-Issue Voting, Forthcoming: Mathematics of Operations Research (joint with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi).
• Optimal Insurance: Dual Utility, Random Losses and Adverse Selection, American Economic Review, 113(10), 2023, 2581-2614. (joint with Alex Gershkov, Phillip Strack and Mengxi Zhang).
• Voting with Interdependent Values and the Condorcet Winner,  Games and Economic Behavior, 142, 2023, 193-208, (joint with Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner and Xianwen Shi)
• Optimal Auctions: Non-Expected Utility and Constant Risk Aversion, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 89, Issue 5, 2022, 2630–2662 (joint with Alex Gershkov, Philipp Strack and Mengxi Zhang).
• Extreme Points and Majorization: Economic Applications¹⁶, Econometrica, Volume 89, Issue 4, July 2021, 1557-1593 ( joint with Andreas Kleiner and Philipp Strack).
• A Theory of Auctions with Endogenous Valuations¹⁷, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 129, Issue 4, April 2021, 1011-1051 (joint with Alex Gershkov, Philipp Strack and Mengxi Zhang).

• Voting Agendas and Preferences on Trees: Theory and Practice¹⁸, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Volume 14(4), November 2022, 538-615 : (joint with Andreas Kleiner).
• Brexit: A Comparison of Dynamic Voting Games with Irreversible Options¹⁹, Volume 130, November 2021, 85-108, Games and Economic Behavior (joint with Frank Rosar),

• Monotonic Norms and Orthogonal Issues in Multidimensional Voting²⁰, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 189, September 2020, 105103 (joint with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi).

• The failure of a Nazi "killer" amendment²¹, Public Choice, Volume 183, Issue 1, July 2019, 1-17 (joint with Andreas Kleiner).

• Voting on Multiple Issues: What to Put on the Ballot?²² Theoretical Economics, Volume 14, Issue 2, 2019, 555-596 (joint with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi).

• The Feedback Effect in Two-Sided Markets with Bilateral Investments²³, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 182, 2019, 106-142 (joint with Deniz Dizdar and Nora Szech).

•  Content-based Agendas and Qualified Majorities in Sequential Voting²⁴, American Economic Review, Volume 107, Issue 6, June 2017, 1477-1506 (joint with Andreas Kleiner).

• Optimal Voting Rules²⁵, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 84, Issue 2, September 2017, 688-717 (joint with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi).

• Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms with Strategic Customers and Unknown, Markovian Demand²⁶, Management Science, June 2018 (joint with Alex Gershkov and Philipp Strack).

• On the Importance of Uniform Sharing Rules for Efficient Matching²⁷, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 165, September 2016, 106–123 (joint with Deniz Dizdar).

• On the equivalence of Bayesian and dominant strategy implementation²⁸, Econometrica,  Volume 81, Issue 1, January 2013, 197–220 (joint with Alex Gershkov, Jabob K. Goeree, Alexey Kushnir and Xianwen Shi).

• Specialization and Partisanship in Committee Search²⁹, Theoretical Economics, Volume 8, Issue 3, September 2013, 751-774 (joint with Xianwen Shi).

• Locally robust implementation and its limits³⁰, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 147, Issue 6, November 2012, 2439-2452 (joint with Philippe Jehiel and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn).

• Optimal Search, Learning and Implementation³¹, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 147, Issue 3, May 2012, 881-909 (joint with Alex Gershkov).

• Dynamic Allocation and Pricing: A Mechanism Design Approach³², International Journal of Industrial Organisation, Volume 30, Issue 3, May 2012, 283-286 (joint with Alex Gershkov).

• Non-Bayesian Optimal Search and Dynamic Implementation³³, Economic Letters, Volume 118, Issue 1, January 2013, 121-125 (joint with Alex Gershkov).

• Optimal Seedings in Elimination Tournaments³⁴, Economic Theory, Vol. 49, 2012, 59-80 (joint with Christian Groh, Aner Sela and Uwe Sunde).

• Coarse Matching with Incomplete Information³⁵, Economic Theory, Vol. 47, 2011, 73-104 (joint with Heidrun Hoppe and Emre Ozdenoren).

• Carrots and Sticks: Prizes and Punishments in Contests³⁶, Economic Inquiry, Volume 50, Issue 2, April 2012, 453-462 (joint with Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi).

• Revenue Maximization in the Dynamic Knapsack Problem³⁷, Theoretical Economics, Vol.6, Issue 2, 2011, 157-184 (joint with Deniz Dizdar and Alex Gershkov).

• Efficient Sequential Assignment with Incomplete Information³⁸, Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 68, Issue 1, 2010, 144-154 (joint with Alex Gershkov).

• Learning About The Future and Dynamic Efficiency³⁹,  American Economic Review, Vol. 99, Issue 4, 2009, 1576-1588 (joint with Alex Gershkov).

• The Theory of Assortative Matching Based on Costly Signals⁴⁰, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 76, Issue 1, 2009, 253-281 (joint with Heidrun Hoppe and Aner Sela).

• Dynamic Revenue Maximization with Heterogeneous Objects: A Mechanism Design Approach⁴¹, American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, Vol. 1, Issue 2, 2009, 98-168 (joint with Alex Gershkov). Winner of the first AEA Best Paper Award for AEJ: Microeconomics.

• Competing Auctions with Endogenous Quantities⁴², Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 141, 2008, 1-27 (joint with Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi).

• Ex-post Implementation and Preference Aggregation via Potentials⁴³, Economic Theory, Vol. 37,  No. 3, 2008, 469 - 490 (joint with Philippe Jehiel and Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn).

• Contests for Status⁴⁴, Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 115, 2007, 338-363 (joint with Aner Sela and Xianwen Shi).

• Mixed Bundling Auctions⁴⁵, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 134, 2007, 494-512 (joint with Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and Philippe Jehiel) .

• Posterior Implementation vs Ex-Post Implementation⁴⁶, Economics Letters, Vol. 97, 2007, 70-73 (joint with Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and William R. Zame).

• The Limits of Ex-Post Implementation⁴⁷, Econometrica, Vol. 74, No. 3, May 2006, 585-610 (joint with Philippe Jehiel, Moritz Meyer-ter-Vehn and William R. Zame).

• Allocative and Informational Externalities in Auctions and Related Mechanisms⁴⁸, in The Proceedings of the 9th World Congress of the Econometric Society, edited by Richard Blundell, Whitney Newey, and Torsten Persson, Cambridge University Press, 2006 (joint with Philippe Jehiel).

• Contest Architecture⁴⁹, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 126, No. 1, January 2006, 70-97 (with Aner Sela).

• License Auctions and Market Structure⁵⁰, Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, Vol. 15, No 2, Summer 2006, 371-396 (with Heidrun Hoppe and Philippe Jehiel).

• Priority Auctions and Queue Disciplines that Depend on Processing Time⁵¹, Management Science , Vol. 51, No. 2, 2005, 236-248 (joint with Thomas Kittsteiner).

• The Design of an Efficient Private Industry⁵², Journal of the European Economic Association , Vol. 2, 2-3, April- May 2004, 516-525 (joint with Philippe Jehiel).

• An Experimental analysis of auctions with interdependent valuations ⁵³(with Oliver Kirchkamp), Games and Economic Behavior, Vol. 48, Issue 1, July 2004, 54-85.

• Allocation Mechanisms and Post-Allocation Interaction⁵⁴, in Auctioning Public Assets Analysis and Alternatives, M. Janssen ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004 (with M. Janssen).

• An Analysis of the European 3G Licensing Process, in Auctioning Public Assets Analysis and Alternatives, M. Janssen ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004 (with E. Maasland).

• Matching Markets, Auctioning Public Assets Analysis and Alternatives, in Auctioning Public Assets Analysis and Alternatives, M. Janssen ed., Cambridge University Press, 2004.

• Partnerships, Lemons and Efficient Trade⁵⁵, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 113, 2003, 223-234 (with Karsten Fieseler and Thomas Kittsteiner).

• An Economic Perspective on Auctions⁵⁶, Economic Policy, Vol. 36, April 2003, 271-308 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• Patent Licensing to Bertrand Competitors⁵⁷, International Journal of Industrial Organization, Vol. 21, 2003, 1-13 (with Aner Sela).

• The German UMTS Design: Insights From Multi-Object Auction Theory⁵⁸, ifo studies, 1/2001, 157-173, reprinted in Spectrum Auction and Competition in Telecommunications, Illing, G.(ed.), MIT Press 2003 (with Christian Ewerhart).

• Bid Costs and Endogenous Bid Caps⁵⁹, RAND Journal of Economics, Vol. 33, Issue 4, Winter 2002, 709-722 (with Arieh Gavious and Aner Sela).

• How to Dissolve a Partnership⁶⁰, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, Volume 158, 2002, 66-80.

• A Practical Approach to Multi-Attribute Auctions⁶¹, DEXA Workshops 2002, 670- 674 (with B. Burmeister, T. Ihde, T.Kittsteiner and J. Nikutta).

• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations⁶², Econometrica, Volume 69, Issue 5, 2001, 1237-1259 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• The Optimal Allocation of Prizes in Contests⁶³, American Economic Review, Vol 91, Issue 3, June 2001, 542-558 (with Aner Sela).
  Reprinted in: 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1. Theory of Rent Seeking, Roger Congleton, Airye L. Hillman, Kai A. Konrad, Springer 2008.

• A note of revenue maximization and efficiency in multi-object auctions⁶⁴, Economics Bulletin, Vol. 3, 2001, No.2, 1-5 (with Philippe Jehiel).
• Auctions with Downstream Interaction among Buyers⁶⁵, RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 31, Issue 3, 2000, 768-791 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• Multidimensional Mechanism Design for Auctions with Externalities⁶⁶, Journal of Economic Theory, Volume 85, Issue 2, 1999, 258-294 (with Philippe Jehiel and Ennio Stacchetti).

• Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights⁶⁷, Review of Economic Studie, Volume 66, Issue 4,1999, 971-991 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• Goethe's Second-Price Auction⁶⁸, Journal of Political Economy, Volume 106, Issue 4, 1998, 854-859 (with Manfred Tietzel).

• How (not) to Sell Nuclear Weapons⁶⁹, American Economic Review, Volume 86, Issue 4, 1996, 814-829 (with Philippe Jehiel and Ennio Stacchetti).

• Are Stable Demand Vectors in the Core of Two-Sided Markets? Some Graph-Theoretical Considerations, in Essays in Honor of Reinhard Selten, Springer Verlag, 1996.

• Strategic Non-Participation⁷⁰, RAND Journal of Economics, Volume 27, Issue 1, 1996, 84-98, reprinted in The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed), Edward Elgar 1999 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• The Production and Cost-Sharing of an Excludable Public Good⁷¹, EconomicTheory, Volume 7, 1996, 531-539.

• William Vickrey und die Auktionstheorie⁷², Wirtschaftsdienst, December 1996.

• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation⁷³, Econometrica, Volume 63, Issue 6, 1995, 1321-1337 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• Cyclical Delay in Infinite Horizon Bargaining with Externalities⁷⁴, Review of Economic Studies, Volume 62, Issue 4, 1995, 619-639 (with Philippe Jehiel).

• Order Independent Equilibria⁷⁵, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 9, 1995, 21-35 (with Eyal Winter).

• Consistent Demands for Coalition Formation, in Essays in Game Theory in Honor of Michael Maschler, Nimrod Megiddo ed., Spinger Verlag, Heidelberg, 1994 (with Eyal Winter).

• Core Implementation and Increasing Returns to Scale⁷⁶, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 23, 1994, 533-549 (with Eyal Winter).

• Price Indeterminacy and Bargaining in a Market with Indivisibilities⁷⁷, Journal of Mathematical Economics, Volume 22, 1993, 581-597.

• Coalition-Proof Nash Equilibria and the Core in Three-Player Games⁷⁸, Games and Economic Behavior, Volume 4, 1992, 565-581.

• Stable Bargained Equilibria for Assignment Games without Side Payments⁷⁹, International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 19, 1990, 171-191.

• A Note on a Theorem of Aumann and Dreze⁸⁰, International Journal of Game Theory, Volume 18, 1989, 471-477.

Discussion papers

•  "The Art of Compromising: Voting with Interdependent Values and the Flag of the Weimar Republic⁷⁷" (joint with Alex Gershkov, Andreas Kleiner and Xianwen Shi), University of Bonn, 2019
•  "Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals⁷⁸" (joint with Alex Gershkov and Philipp Strack), University of Bonn, 2014
•  "Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation Revisited⁷⁹" (joint with Alex Gershkov and Xianwen Shi), University of Bonn, 2011 (The content of this paper is now included in "On the Equivalence of Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Implementation")  
• "Auction-Based Queue Disciplines⁸⁰" (joint with Thomas Kittsteiner), University of Bonn, 2003
• "A Stylized Model of the German UMTS Auction⁸¹" (joint with Christian Ewerhart), University of Bonn, 2003, in revision for European Economic Review.
• "The European UMTS/IMT-2000 License Auctions⁸²" (joint with Philippe Jehiel), University of Mannheim, 2001 (The contents of the paper appear in "An Economic Perspective on Auctions", Economic Policy,Vol. 36, April 2003, pp. 271-308)

Press articles

• "Reinhard Selten: Pioneering analyst of rationality and human behavior⁸³", joint with Axel Ockenfels, VOX, 14.09.2016
• "Bluffen drohen zocken⁸⁴", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 24.02.2015 
•  "Europäisches Hasenfusrennen", Handelsblatt, 09.02.2015
•  "Warum sich Preise schnell ändern⁸⁵", Bonner-General-Anzeiger, 24.01.2015
•  "Was steckt hinter kurzfristigen Preisänderungen?", Pressemitteilung der Universität Bonn, 20.01.2015
•  "Wie mächtige Firmen gezähmt werden⁸⁶", Bonner General-Anzeiger, 14.10.2014
•  "Regeln für eine Welt unvollkommener Märkte⁸⁷", Neue Zürcher Zeitung, 17.10.2007.
• "Für ein Plätzchen am Himmel der Funker", Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 29.07.2000.
• "Der Spieltheoretiker", Die Zeit, 27.07.2000.
• "Kleine Verfahrensfehler mit großen Folgen", Financial Times Deutschland, 06.04.2000.
• "Auktionen", Wirtschaftswoche, 04.11.1999.
• "William Vickery und die Auktionstheorie", Wirtschaftsdienst, 12.1996.