Tuesday, June 24, 2025
Bonn Applied Micro Seminar: Hanna Wang, “Job Search and Mobility Over the Life-Cycle: Implications for the Child Penalty”
When:
Tuesday, June 24, 2025, 02:15 PM CET
Where:
IZA - Institute of Labor Economics, Schaumburg-Lippe-Straße 5-9, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Description:
Minji Bang and Hanna Wang:
“Job Search and Mobility Over the Life-Cycle: Implications for the Child Penalty”
We document using Dutch administrative and survey data that women’s job mobility drops around childbirth. Women make fewer job-to-job transitions starting one year before birth until many years after. They are also less likely to engage in on-the-job search and work in jobs with low amenities related to irregular hours. We develop a life-cycle labor supply, job search and job switching model for women in which mothers and pregnant women face higher search costs. Jobs are characterized as bundles of wages and amenities, the latter decrease work disutility. We use the model to quantify a novel channel through which the child penalty operates: because (expecting) mothers perform less job search, they remain in jobs with low wages and amenities, therefore working and earning less. Search costs related to childbirth reduce lifetime earnings by 10.1%, accounting for 33.7% of the child penalty. We validate our model with a recent reform which eliminated tenure requirements for parental leave. Mothers increased job switching before birth but decreased employment in the year of birth.
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Tuesday, July 1, 2025
Bonn Applied Micro Seminar: Ran Spiegler, “Competitive Markets with Imperfectly Discerning Consumers”
When:
Tuesday, July 1, 2025, 02:15 PM CET
Where:
Reinhard Selten Institute, Niebuhrstraße 5, 53113 Bonn, Germany
Description:
Yair Antler and Ran Spiegler:
“Competitive Markets with Imperfectly Discerning Consumers”
In an adversely selective market model, products generate state-dependent potential hidden charges, and firms have differential abilities to realize this exploitative potential. Unlike firms, consumers do not observe the state. They try to infer hidden charges from headline prices, using idiosyncratic subjective models. An interior competitive equilibrium is uniquely characterized by what is formally a Bellman equation. Relative to rational expectations, equilibrium add-on charges are lower whereas the total price and social welfare are higher. Market responses to shocks display patterns that are impossible under rational expectations. For example, although fully revealing, equilibrium prices can vary with consumers’ private information.
https://www.ranspiegler.sites.tau.ac.il/_files/ugd/4871e3_5e9a009e7e724121b2cae57b501ffbce.pdf
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