BONN ECON NEWS

December 16–20, 2024

Overview

Universität Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn
www.econ.uni-bonn.de
Editor: Deike Engel, Department of Economics
Phone: +49 (0)228-73 3070; mail: econpr@uni-bonn.de

Page: 1

Workshops and seminars

Monday, December 16, 2024

MPI EEG Seminar

Michael Darden (Johns Hopkins Carey Business School)	"Medical Innovation and Health Inequality: Evidence from Direct-Acting Antivirals"

Time
11:00–12:00 CET

Location
Max-Planck-Institute, EG Seminar Room

Abstract
We study racial heterogeneity in innovation-induced externalities. Following the introduction of direct-acting antivirals (DAA) for Hepatitis C (HCV+), we show that liver transplants increased for Black (11.9%), Hispanic (34.2%), and white (56.6%) HCV- end-stage liver disease (ESLD) patients. However, only white HCV- ESLD patients saw an increase in the rate of transplantation (19.5 pp), in spite of the fact that marginal white registrants were of better liver health relative to marginal Black registrants. We conclude that HCV+ ESLD patients from most racial groups benefited from the externality generated by DAAs for HCV+ (with the clear exception of Asian patients) but that their introduction likely widened disparities in transplant outcomes between white and non-white patients.

Tuesday, December 17, 2024

ECONtribute LawEcon Workshop

Arna Wömmel (University of Hamburg)	"Algorithmic Fairness: The Role of Beliefs"

Time
18:00–19:15 CET

Location
Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)

Abstract
This paper investigates how decision-makers' beliefs about protected groups interact with fairness-aware algorithmic recommendations in consequential decision-making. Using an online lab experiment, I show that decision-makers who believe that protected group membership strongly predicts outcomes are significantly more likely to override algorithmic recommendations that explicitly exclude protected group membership from input data —even when these recommendations are highly informative— resulting in increased disparities in decision outcomes. This behavior is specific to the exclusion of protected group membership and does not extend to other input variables. This finding suggests that fairness-aware algorithmic decision-support tools may backfire in the very situations they are intended to address: mitigating biased human judgment.

Wednesday, December 18, 2024

BGSE Micro Workshop

Yimeng Zhang (University of Bonn)	"Coarse Information Design"

Coauthors
Qianjun Lyu, Wing Suen

Time
12:00–13:00 CET

Location
Juridicum, Reinhard Selten Room (0.017)

Abstract
We study an information design problem with continuous state and discrete signal space. Under convex value functions, the optimal information structure is interval-partitional and exhibits a dual expectations property: each induced signal is the conditional mean (taken under the prior density) of each interval; and each interval cutoff is the conditional mean (taken under the value function curvature) of the interval formed by neighboring signals. This property enables an examination into which part of the state space is more finely partitioned. The analysis can be extended to general value functions and adapted to study coarse mechanism design.

MEF/Finance/ECONtribute Seminar (Macro/Econometrics/Finance)

Juliane Begenau (Standford University)	"Title"

Time
12:15–13:30 CET

Location
Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)

Abstract
TBA

Macro Internal Seminar

Luis Calderon (University of Bonn)	"Distributional Counterfactuals"

Time
15:00–15:30 CET

Location
Kaiserplatz 7-9, 4.006

Abstract

Moritz May (University of Bonn)	"Financial Constraints and Subjective Labor Market Beliefs"

Time
15:30–16:00 CET

Location
Kaiserplatz 7-9, 4.006

Abstract

Micro Theory Seminar

Shaofei Jiang
(University of Bonn)

"Persuasion via sequentially acquired evidence"

Time
16:30–17:45 CET

Location
Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)

Abstract

I study a sender who can sequentially acquire and partially disclose hard evidence to persuade a receiver about a binary state of the world. The sender privately and sequentially acquires noisy binary signals. Signals are time-stamped and costly to acquire. When she stops, the sender discloses a left truncation of the signals. That is, it is possible to omit some most dated signals. The receiver, uncertain of how many signals the sender acquires, takes a binary action based on the difference between the number of good and bad signals in the disclosure. If the cost is not too high, there is a continuum of persuasion equilibria, and the receiver's posterior belief is supported on two points. If full disclosure of signals is mandatory, the game is equivalent to costly Bayesian persuasion. This benefits the sender and hurts the receiver.

Thursday, December 19, 2024

BGSE Presentations, Statistics

BGSE Presentations

Nico Thurow: "Classifying Measurement Error in German Gross Income Metrics Using Linked Survey and Adminitrative Data"

Time

09:45–10:30 CET

Julian Budde: "Statistical Inference in Partially Identified Marginal Treatment Effect Models"

Time

10:30 – 11:15 CET

Egshiglen Batbayar: "Quantile Selection in the Gender Pay Gap"

Time

11:15–12:00 CET

Nebi Simsek: "Large Sample Properties of Functionals of Non-Smooth Sieve Estimators"

Time

13:15 – 14:00 CET

Chencheng Feng: "Honest Causal Inference with Difference-in-Differences: A Functional Data Perspective"

Time

14:00 – 14:45 CET

Antonia Antweiler & Julius Kappenberg: "Analysis of the Variance of the Treatment Effect in DiD"

Time

14:45 – 15:45 CET

Location

Juridicum, Faculty Meeting Room (U1.040)

Friday, December 20, 2024

Bonn Macro Internal Seminar

Mark Toth (University of Bonn)	"The role of city structure in monetary policy transmission"

Time
16:00–17:00 CET

Abstract
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Location
Kaiserplatz 7–9, Room 4.006