Universität Bonn

Department of Economics / BonnEconLab

en

Prof. em. Dr. Dr. h. c. mult. Reinhard Selten

Eine Wissenschaftlerin und ein Wissenschaftler arbeiten hinter einer Glasfassade und mischen Chemikalien mit Großgeräten.
© Uni Bonn/Volker Lannert

Research interests

  • Theories of bounded rationality
  • Game theory and its applications
  • Experimental economics

Abstract of Professor Selten’s academic work

Professor Reinhard Selten was awarded the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel in 1994 for two publications from the years 1965 and 1975. With these papers Selten achieved a decisive breakthrough in game theory: The introduction of the concepts of sub-game perfect and perfect equillibria reduced the set of Nash equillibria drastically by excluding threats that are not credible. Thus, more percise and sensible predictions can be made for many games, for instance, markets. Selten’s work contributed greatly to the applicability of game theory to large parts of economic theory. Today, most of the leading scientific journals are dominated by game theoretic articles. Additionally, game theory has found applications in all of social sciences and even in biology.

Selten calls himself a “methodic dualist.” Next to his work on normative theory, in which subjects are presumed completely rational, he always also was—and recently has even been more—concerned with research on descriptive theories, with which the observed boundedly rational behavior of subjects is explained. In the early 1980s, Selten was first to introduce experimental economics in Germany. He ran experiments in which subjects made economic decisions in a controlled environment. The goal of these—and of the various other experiments he ran later—was to construct positive theories with which the subjects’ boundedly rational behavior could be better described and predicted than with traditional theory. Quite a number of such descriptive theories have evolved in the years in which Selten and his team at the Bonn Laboratory for Experimental Economics have been doing experimental work.

Curriculum Vitae

Reinhard Selten was born in Breslau (Wrocław; then Germany, now Poland), on October 5, 1930. He died in Poznán (Poland) on August 23, 2016.

Reinhard Selten was Fellow of the Econometric Society, Fellow of the European Economic Association, he was President of the European Economic Association, Honorary Member of the American Economic Association, Member of the Nordrhein-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften, Foreign Honorary Member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and Member of the Order Pour le Mérite for Arts and Sciences. He is also Honora Patrona Komitato at Universala Esperanto Asocio.

His main areas of interest were Game Theory and its applications as well as Experimental Economics and the Theory of Bounded Rationality.

  • 1957: Master’s thesis in Mathematics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany
  • 1957–1967: Research assistant to Professor Heinz Sauermann at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany
  • 1961: Ph.D. thesis in Mathematics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany
  • 1967–1968: Visiting Full Professor, School of Business Administration, University of California at Berkeley, Berkeley, USA
  • 1968: Habilitation Thesis in Economics at the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany
  • 1969–1972: Full Professor at the Department of Economics, Freie Universität Berlin, Germany
  • 1972–1984: Full Professor at the Institute for Mathematical Economics, University of Bielefeld, Germany
  • 1984–2016: Full Professor at the Department of Economics, Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn, Germany
  • 1989 Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics from the University of Bielefeld, Germany
  • 1991 Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics from the Johann Wolfgang Goethe University in Frankfurt/Main, Germany
  • 1994 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics (The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel), jointly with John C. Harsanyi and John F. Nash
  • 1996 Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics from the University of Graz, Austria
  • 1996 Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics from the University of Breslau, Poland
  • 1996 Honorary Professor of the Jiaotong University of Shanghai, Peoples' Republic of China
  • 1997 Honorary Doctoral Degree in Economics in Norwich
  • 1998 Honorary Doctoral Degree from the ENS de Cachan
  • 2000 Honorary Doctoral Degree from the University of Innsbruck
  • 2000 Prize of the State North Rhine-Westfalia
  • 2003 Honorary Doctoral Degree from the Chinese Universiy of Hong Kong, Peoples’ Republic of China
  • 2006 Order Pour le Mérite for Arts and Sciences
  • 2006 Honorary Doctoral Degree from the University of Osnabrück
  • 2007 Honorary Senator of the Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität Bonn
  • 2008 Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of Bialystok (Polen)
  • 2009 Honorary Doctoral Degree of the Georg August University Göttingen

Publications

Journal Articles

  • Heinz Sauermann and Reinhard Selten. 1959. “Ein Oligopolexperiment.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 115: 427–471. Reprinted in Heinz Sauermann (ed.). Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck). 1967: 9–59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748152.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1960. “Bewertung strategischer Spiele.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 116: 221–281. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748200.
  • Heinz Sauermann and Reinhard Selten. 1962. “Anspruchsanpassungstheorie der Unternehmung.“ Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 118: 577–597. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748622.
  • Rudolf Richter and Reinhard Selten. 1963. “Dynamische Theorie der Built-in Flexibility.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 119: 555–578. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748712.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1965. “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit – Teil I: Bestimmung des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121: 301–324. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748884.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1965. “Spieltheoretische Behandlung eines Oligopolmodells mit Nachfrageträgheit – Teil II: Eigenschaften des dynamischen Preisgleichgewichts.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 121: 667–689. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40748908.
  • John C. Harsanyi and Reinhard Selten. 1972. “A Generalized Nash Solution for Two-Person Bargaining Games with Incomplete Information.” Management Science 18 (5) Part 2 (January): 80–106. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.18.5.80.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1973. “A Simple Model of Imperfect Competition where 4 are Few and 6 are Many.” International Journal of Game Theory 2 (3): 141–201. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01737566.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1975. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” International Journal of Game Theory 4 (1): 25-55. Reprinted in H.W. Kuhn (ed.). Classics in Game Theory Princeton University Press. 1997: 317–54. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_1.
  • Thomas Marschak and Reinhard Selten. 1977. “Oligopolistic Economies as Games of Limited Information.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 133 (October): 385–410. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40750347.
  • Thomas Marschak and Reinhard Selten. 1978. “Restabilizing Responses, Inertia Supergames and Oligopolistic Equilibria.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 92 (1) (February): 71–93. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885999.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1978. “The Chain Store Paradox.” Theory and Decision 9 (2) (April): 127–159. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00131770.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1980. “A Note on Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Asymmetric Animal Conflicts.” Journal of Theoretical Biology 83: 93–101. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-015-7774-8_3.
  • Reinhard Selten and Reinhard Tietz. 1980. “Zum Selbstverständnis der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung im Umkreis von Heinz Sauermann.” Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft 136 (1) (March): 12–27. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40750195.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1980. “Was ist eigentlich aus der Spieltheorie geworden?” IHS-Journal 4: 147–161.
  • Reinhard Selten and Werner Güth. 1982. “Game Theoretical Analysis of Wage Bargaining in a Simple Business Cycle Model.” Journal of Mathematical Economics 10 (2-3) (September): 177–195. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(82)90036-2.
  • Reinhard Selten and Ulrike Leopold. 1983. “Equilibrium Point Selection in a Bargaining Situation with Opportunity Costs.” Economie Appliquée 36 (4): 611–648.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1983. “A Model of Oligopolistic Size, Structure, and Profitability.” European Economic Review 22 (June): 33–57. https://doi.org/10.1016/0014-2921(83)90088-0.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1983. “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games.” Mathematical Social Sciences, 5 (3): 269–363. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(83)90012-4.
  • Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein. 1984. “Gaps in Harley's Argument on Evolutionarily Stable Learning Rules and in the Logic of "Tit for Tat".” The Behavioral and Brain Sciences 7 (1): 115–116. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00026479.
  • Reinhard Selten and Rolf Stoecker. 1986. “End Behavior in Sequences of Finite Prisoner's Dilemma Supergames.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 7 (1): 47–70. https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(86)90021-1.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1988. “Evolutionary Stability in Extensive Two-Person Games, Correction and Further Development.” Mathematical Social Sciences 16 (3) (December): 223–266. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(88)90040-6.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1990. “Bounded Rationality.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 146 (4) (December): 649–658. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40751353.
  • Eric van Damme, Reinhard Selten, and Eyal Winter. 1990. “Alternating Bid Bargaining with a Smallest Money Unit.” Games and Economic Behavior 2: 188–201. https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(90)90029-T.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Evolution, Learning, and Economic Behavior.” 1989 Nancy Schwartz Memorial Lecture. Games and Economic Behavior 3 (1) (February): 3–24.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Properties of a Measure of Predictive Success.” Mathematical Social Sciences 21 (2) (April): 153–167. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(91)90076-4.
  • Reinhard Selten, Ronen Kadmon, and Avi Shmida. 1991. “Within-Plant Foraging Behavior of Bees and Its Relationship to Nectar Distribution in Anchusa Strigosa.” Israel Journal of Botany 40: 283–294. https://doi.org/10.1080/0021213X.1991.10677206.
  • Reinhard Selten and Bettina Kuon. 1993. “Demand Commitment Bargaining in Three-Person Quota Game Experiments.” International Journal of Game Theory 22: 261–277. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01240057.
  • Reinhard Selten and Eyal Winter. 1994. “An Axiomatic Approach to Consumers’ Welfare.” Mathematical Social Sciences 27 (1) (February): 19–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(94)00728-4.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1994. “New Challenges to the Rationality Assumption: Comment.” Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 150 (1) (March): 42–44.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1995. “An Axiomatic Theory of a Risk Dominance Measure for Bipolar Games with Linear Incentives.” Games and Economic Behavior 8 (1) (January): 213–263. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(05)80021-1.
  • Reinhard Selten and Peter Hammerstein. 1996. “The work of John Nash in Game Theory.” Journal of Economic Theory 69: 161–165.
  • Reinhard Selten, Michael Mitzkewitz, and Gerald R. Uhlich. 1997. “Duopoly Strategies Programmed by Experienced Players.” Econometrica 65 (3) (May): 517–555. https://doi.org/10.2307/2171752.
  • Reinhard Selten and Axel Ockenfels. 1998. “An Experimental Solidarity Game.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 34 (4): 517–519. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-2681(97)00107-8.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1998. “Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames.” Theory and Decision 44 (1) (January): 1–36. Previously published in: Tore Frängsmyr (ed.). Les Prix Nobel 1994: 320–348. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005099909043.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1998. “Aspiration Adaptation Theory.” Journal of Mathematical Psychology 42: 191–214. https://doi.org/10.1006/jmps.1997.1205.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1998. “Axiomatic Characterization of the Quadratic Scoring Rule.” Experimental Economics, 1 (1): 43–62. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1009957816843.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1998. “Features of Experimentally Observed Bounded Rationality.” European Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings) 42 (2–5): 413–436. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00148-7.
  • Reinhard Selten and Rosemarie Nagel. 1998. “Das Zahlenwahlspiel.” Spektrum der Wissenschaft 1: 89–91.
  • Reinhard Selten, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Klaus Abbink. 1999. “Money Does not Induce Risk Neutral Behavior, but Binary Lotteries Do Even Worse.” Theory and Decision 46 (3): 213–252. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005038628305.
  • Reinhard Selten, Wulf Albers, Robin Pope and Bodo Vogt. 2000. “Experimental Evidence for Attractions to Chance.” German Economic Review 1 (2): 113–130. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0475.t01-1-00007.
  • Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten. 2000. “An Experiment on the Hypothesis of Involuntary Truth-Signalling in Bargaining.” Games and Economic Behavior 33: 138–152. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0762.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2000. “Eingeschränkte Rationalität und ökonomische Motivation.” Zeitschrift für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften Beiheft 9: 129–157.
  • Reinhard Selten and Myrna Wooders. 2001. “Cyclic Games, An Introduction and Examples.” Games and Economic Behavior 34: 138–152. https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1999.0797.
  • Reinhard Selten and Axel Ostmann. 2001. “Imitation Equilibrium.” Homo oeconomicus 43: 111–149.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2001. “Postscript.” Games and Economic Behavior 36: 47–50.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2001. “John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator.” Games and Economic Behavior 36: 31–46. Reprinted from: Rational Interaction, essays in Honor of John C. Harsanyi. Berlin: Springer-Verlag. 1992. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-09664-2_24.
  • Reinhard Selten and Robin Pope. 2002. “Local Manufacturing Hurt by Depreciations in a Theoretical Model Reflecting the Australian Experience.” Pacific Economic Review 7. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0106.00171.
  • Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Reinhard Selten. 2002. “The Behavioral Approach to the Strategic Analysis of Spectrum Auctions – The Case of the German DCS-1800 Auction.” ifo-Studien Zeitschrift für empirische Wirtschaftsforschung 48 (3): 457–480.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2002. “Remarks about Karl Otwin Becker.” Central European Journal of Operations Research 10 (10): 187–190.
  • Klaus Abbink, Ron Darziv, Zohar Gilula, Harel Goren, Bernd Irlenbusch, Arnon Keren, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, Reinhard Selten, and Shmuel Zamir. 2003. “The Fisherman's Problem: Exploring the tension between cooperative and noncooperative concepts in a simple game.” Journal of Economic Psychology 24: 425–445. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0167-4870(03)00014-X.
  • Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Joachim Buchta, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. 2003. “How to play (3 × 3)-games. A strategy method experiment.” Games and Economic Behavior 45: 19–37. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00528-6.
  • Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, and Ricarda Cox. 2005. “Learning Direction Theory and the Winner’s Curse.” Experimental Economics 8: 5–20. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-005-1407-5.
  • Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, Paul Pezanis-Christou, Bettina Rockenbach, Abdolkarim Sadrieh, and Reinhard Selten. 2005. “An Experimental Test of Design Alternatives for the British 3G/UMTS Auction.” European Economic Review 49: 503–530. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(03)00044-8.
  • Axel Ockenfels and Reinhard Selten. 2005. “Impulse Balance Equilibrium and Feedback in First Price Auctions.” Games and Economic Behavior 51: 155–170. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.04.002.
  • Reinhard Selten and Jose Apesteguia. 2005. “Experimentally Observed Imitation and Cooperation in Price Competition on the Circle.” Games and Economic Behavior 51: 171–192. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.03.005.
  • Otwin Becker, Tanja Feit, Vera Hofer, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Jörg Schütze, and Reinhard Selten. 2005. “Das Marketingspiel SINTO und seine Vorzüge als Unternehmensplanspiel.” SEM/RADAR Zeitschrift für Systemdenken und Entscheidungsfindung im Management, Falko E.P. Wilms (Hrsg.), 4. Jahrgang, Ausgabe 1: 3–18.
  • Tibor Neugebauer and Reinhard Selten. 2006. “Individual Behavior of First-Price Sealed-Bid Auctions: The Importance of Information Feedback in Experimental Markets.” Games and Economic Behavior 54: 183–204. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.10.001.
  • Myrna Wooders, Edward Cartwright, and Reinhard Selten. 2006. “Behavioral Conformity in Games with Many Players.” Games and Economic Behavior 57: 347–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2005.09.006.
  • Otwin Becker, Tanja Feit, Vera Hofer, Ulrike Leopold-Wildburger, Robin Pope, and Reinhard Selten. 2006. “Männer schöpfen Märkte besser aus – Empirische Evidenz anhand des Unternehmensplanspiels SINTO-Markt.” Perspektiven der Wirtschaftspolitik 7 (4): 445–458. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2516.00221.
  • Reinhard Selten, Michael Schreckenberg, Thomas Pitz, Thorsten Chmura, and Sebastian Kube. 2007. “Commuters’ Route Choice Behavior.” Games and Economic Behavior 58: 394–406r. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.012.
  • Jose Apuesteguia, Martin Dufwenberg, and Reinhard Selten. 2007. “Blowing the Whistle.” Economic Theory 31: 143–166. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-006-0092-8.
  • Reinhard Selten and Massimo Warglien. 2007. “The Emergence of Simple Languages in an Experimental Coordination Game.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America 104 (18): 7361–7366. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.0702077104.
  • Christine Harbring, Bernd Irlenbusch, Matthias Kräkel, and Reinhard Selten. 2007. “Sabotage in Corporate Contests – An Experimental Analysis.” International Journal of the Economics of Business (14): 367–392. https://doi.org/10.1080/13571510701597445.
  • Gary Bornstein, Tamar Kugler, David V. Budescu, and Reinhard Selten. 2008. “Repeated price competition between teams.” Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 66: 808–821. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2006.06.004.
  • Reinhard Selten and Thorsten Chmura. 2008. “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2 Games.” American Economic Review 98 (3): 938–966. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.98.3.938.
  • Sebastian J. Goerg and Reinhard Selten. 2009. “Experimental Investigation of Stationary Concepts in Cyclic Duopoly Games.” Experimental Economics 12 (3): 253–271. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-009-9218-8.
  • Reinhard Selten, Sebastian Goerg, and Thorsten Chmura. 2011. “Stationary Concepts for Experimental 2 × 2 Games: Reply.” American Economic Review 101 (2): 1041–1044. https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.101.2.1041.
  • Heike Hennig-Schmidt, Reinhard Selten, and Daniel Wiesen. 2011. “How payment systems affect physicians’ provision behaviour—an experimental investigation.” Journal of Health Economics 30 (4): 637–646. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jhealeco.2011.05.001.
  • Özgür Gürerk and Reinhard Selten. 2012. “The effect of payoff tables on experimental oligopoly behavior.” Experimental Economics 15 (3): 499–509. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-011-9310-8.
  • Ronald M. Harstad and Reinhard Selten. 2013. “Bounded-Rationality Models: Tasks to Become Intellectually Competitive.” Journal of Economic Literature 51 (2): 496–511. https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.51.2.496.

Chapters in Books

  • Heinz Sauermann and Reinhard Selten. 1960. “An Experiment in Oligopoly.” In General Systems, Yearbook of the Society for General Systems Research 5, Ann Arbor, 85–114. MI: Society for General Systems (translation of 1959 journal article with Heinz Sauermann).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1964. “Valuation of n-Person Games.” In Advances in Game Theory Annals of Mathematics Studies 52, 555–578. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
  • Reinhard Selten and Reinhard Tietz. 1967. “Der Rangsummentest - Beschreibung und Signifikanztafeln.” In Operations Research Verfahren III, edited by Rudolf Henn, 353–375. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain.
  • Heinz Sauermann and Reinhard Selten. 1967. “Zur Entwicklung der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 1–8. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1967. “Investitionsverhalten im Oligopolexperiment.” In Beiträge zur experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 60–102. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1967. “Ein Oligopolexperiment mit Preisvariation und Investition.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 103–135. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1967. “Die Strategiemethode zur Erforschung des eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens im Rahmen eines Oligopolexperiments.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 136–168. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten and Klaus G. Schuster. 1968. “Psychological Variables and Coalition Forming Behavior.” In Risk and Uncertainty, Proceedings of a Conference held by the International Economic Association, edited by Karl Borch and Jan Mossin, 221–240. London-Melbourne-Toronto-New York: Macmillan/St Martin’s Press.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1970. “Ein Marktexperiment.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 2, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 33–98. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten and Klaus G. Schuster. 1970. “Psychologische Faktoren bei Koalitionsverhandlungen.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 2, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 99–135. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Otwin Becker and Reinhard Selten. 1970. “Experiences with the Management Game SINTO-Market.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 2, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 136–150. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten and Claus C. Berg. 1970. “Drei experimentelle Oligopolspielserien mit kontinuierlichem Zeitablauf.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 2, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 162–221. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten and Claus C. Berg. 1970. “Ein Gerät zur optischen und akustischen Anzeige von Entscheidungszeitpunkten in Oligopolexperimenten mit kontinuierlicher Zeit.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung 2, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 222–229. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1971. “Anwendungen der Spieltheorie auf die politische Wissenschaft.” In Politik und Wissenschaft, edited by Hans Maier, Klaus Ritter and Ulrich Matz, 287–320. München: C. H. Beck.
  • Reinhard Selten and Reinhard Tietz. 1972. “Security Equilibria.” (with ) In The Future of the international Strategic System, edited by Richard Rosecrance, 103–122. San Francisco-Scranton-London-Toronto: Chandler Publishing Company.
  • Reinhard Selten and Reinhard Tietz. 1972. “A Formal Theory of Security Equilibria.” In The Future of the International Strategic System, edited by Richard Rosecrance, 185–202. San Francisco-Scranton-London-Toronto: Chandler Publishing Company.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1972. “Equal Share Analysis of Characteristic Function Experiments.” In Beiträge zur experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung - Contributions to Experimental Economics 3, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 130–165. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1975. “Bargaining under Incomplete Information - A Numerical Example.” In Dynamische Wirtschaftsanalyse, edited by Otwin Becker and Rudolf Richter, 203–232. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1976. “Wirtschaftswissenschaft und Mathematik.” In Mathematisierung der Einzelwissenschaften, edited by B. Booa and K. Krickeberg, Interdisciplinary Systems Research 24. Basel: Birkhäuser Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1977. “A Simple Game Model of Kidnapping.” In Mathematical Economics and Game Theory, edited by R. Henn and O. Moeschlin, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 141, 139–156. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • A. Hoggatt, Reinhard Selten, D. Crockett, S. Gill and, J. Moore. 1978. “Bargaining Experiments with Incomplete Information.” In Contributions to Experimental Economics 7, edited by Heinz Sauermann, 127–178. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr (Paul Siebeck).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1978. “The Equity Principle in Economic Behavior.” In Decision Theory Social Ethics, Issues in Social Choice, edited by H.W. Gottinger and W. Leinfellner, 289–301. Dordrecht/Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
  • Reinhard Selten and Werner Güth. 1978. “Macht Einigkeit stark? Spieltheoretische Analysen einer Verhandlungssituation.” In Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik Band 98, Neuere Entwicklungen in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, 197–217.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1979. “Experimentelle Wirtschaftsforschung.” In Rheinisch-Westfälische Akademie der Wissenschaften Vorträge N. 287, 41–61. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1979. “Limited Rationality and Structural Uncertainty.” In Wittgenstein, The Vienna Circle and Critical Rationalism (Wittgenstein, der Wiener Kreis und der kritische Rationalismus), 476–483. Proceedings of the 3rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, 13th to 19th August 1978, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Austria.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1979. “Coalition Probabilities in a Non-Cooperative Model of Three-Person Quota Game Bargaining.” In Mathematical Systems in Economics - Entscheidungen in kleinen Gruppen, edited by Wulf Albers, Günter Bamberg and Reinhard Selten, 90–106. Meisenheim: Verlag Anton Hain.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1979. “Oligopoltheorie.” In Handwörterbuch der Mathematischen Wirtschaftswissenschaften, 293–301. Wiesbaden: Gabler-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Ulrike Leopold. 1980. “Auswahl eines Gleichgewichtspunktes in einem einfachen Verhandlungsproblem mit Opportunitätskosten.” In Methods of Operations Research 38, edited by Rudolf Henn et al, Königstein/Taunus: Verlagsgruppe Athenaeum/Hain/Scriptor/Hanstein.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1980. “Oligopoltheorie.” In Handwörterbuch der Wirtschaftswissenschaften, edited by W. Albers et al., 667–678. Stuttgart-New York: Gustav Fischer.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1981. “A Noncooperative Model of Characteristic Function Bargaining.” In Essays in Game Theory and Mathematical Economics in Honor of Oskar Morgenstern, In Gesellschaft, Recht, Wirtschaft Band 4., edited by V. Bohm and H. Nachtkamp, 131–151. Mannheim-Wien-Zürich: Wissenschaftsverlag Bibliographisches Institut.
  • Reinhard Selten and Werner Güth. 1982. “Equilibrium Point Selection in a Class of Market Entry Games.” In Games, Economics, and Time Series Analysis, 101–116. Wien-Würzburg: Physica-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Ulrike Leipold. 1982. “Gleichgewichtsauswahl in einer Gehaltsverhandlungssituation mit unvollständiger Information.” In Information in der Wirtschaft, Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik, Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften, Neue Folge Band 126, edited by E. Streißler, 155–161. Berlin.
  • Reinhard Selten and Ulrike Leopold. 1982. “Subjunctive Conditionals in Decision and Game Theory.” In Philosophy of Economics, edited by W. Stegmueller, W. Balzer and W. Spohn, 191–200. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1982. “Equilibrium Selection in a Wage Bargaining Situation with Opportunity Costs.” (with Ulrike Leipold) In Operations Research Verfahren 41, edited by Rainer E. Burkard and Thomas Ellinger, 91–101. Königstein: Athenäum-Hain.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1982. “Einführung in die Theorie der Spiele mit unvollständiger Information.” In Schriften des Vereins für Socialpolitik Band 126, Information in der Wirtschaft, 81–147.
  • Reinhard Selten and Wilhelm Krischker. 1983. “Comparison of Two Theories for Characteristic Function Experiments.” In Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, edited by R. Tietz, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 213, 259–264. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1983. “Equal Division Payoff Bounds for Three-Person Characteristic Function Experiments.” In Aspiration Levels in Bargaining and Economic Decision Making, edited by R. Tietz, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 213, 255–275. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1983. “Towards a Theory of Limited Rationality.” In Decision Making under Uncertainty, edited by R. Scholz, 409–412. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1984. “Are Cartel Laws Bad for Business?” In Operations Research and Economic Theory, edited by H. Hauptmann, W. Krelle and K.C. Mosler, 86–117. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Angela Klopstech and Reinhard Selten. 1984. “Formale Konzepte eingeschränkt rationalen Verhaltens.” In Normengeleitetes Verhalten in den Sozialwissenschaften, edited by H. Todt, 11–34. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1985. “Comment to R.J. Aumann: What is Game Theory Trying to Accomplish?” In Frontiers of Economics, edited by K.J. Arrow and S. Honkapohja, 77–87. Oxford-New York: Basil Blackwell.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1986. “Elementary Theory of Slack-Ridden Imperfect Competition.” In New Developments in the Analysis of Market Structure, edited by J. Stiglitz and G. Mathewson, 126–144. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1986. “Institutional Utilitarianism.” In Guidance, Control, and Evaluation in the Public Sector, edited by F. Kaufmann, G. Majone, V. Ostrom with assistance of W. Wirth, 241–263. Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1987. “Equity and Coalition Bargaining in Experimental Three-Person Games.” In Laboratory Experimentation in Economics - Six Points of View, edited by Alvin E. Roth, 42–98. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Reinhard Selten and Gerald R. Uhlich. 1988. “Order of Strength and Exhaustivity as Additional Hypotheses in Theories for 3-Person Characteristic Function Games.” In Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, edited by R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 314, 235–250. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1988. “Bounded rational behavior in experimental games and markets: Proceedings of the Fourth Conference on Experimental Economics.” In Bounded Rational Behavior in Experimental Games and Markets, edited by R. Tietz, W. Albers and R. Selten, Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems 314, Bielefeld, West Germany, September 21-25, 1986, 235–250. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Werner Güth and Reinhard Selten. 1989. “On the Time Aspect of International Negotiations and the Probability for Reaching an Agreement: An Incomplete Information Approach.” In Processes of International Negotiations, edited by Frances Mautner-Markhof, 319–333. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1990. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” In Game Theory in Economics, 5, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 121–151. Aldershot, U.K. and Brookefield, VT, Elgar. (previously published in 1975).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1990. “The Chain Store Paradox.” In Game Theory in Economics, 5, edited by Ariel Rubinstein, International Library of Critical Writings in Economics, 121–151. Aldershot, U.K. and Brookefield, VT, Elgar. (previously published in 1975).
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Anticipatory Learning in Two-Person Games.” In Game Equilibrium Models I, edited by Reinhard Selten, 98–153. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Avi Shmida. 1991. “Pollinator Foraging and Flower Competition in a Game Equilibrium Model.” In Game Equilibrium Models I, edited by Reinhard Selten, 195–246. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Werner Güth. 1991. “Original or Fake - A Bargaining Game with Incomplete Information.” In Game Equilibrium Models III, edited by Reinhard Selten, 186–224. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Myrna H. Wooders. 1991. “A Game Equilibrium Model of Thin Markets.” In Game Equilibrium Models III, edited by Reinhard Selten, 242–280. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Majority Voting in the Condorcet Paradox as a Problem of Equilibrium Selection.” (with Werner Güth) In Game Equilibrium Models IV, edited by Reinhard Selten, 7–40. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and Jonathan Pool. 1991. “The Distribution of Foreign Language Skills as a Game Equilibrium.” In Game Equilibrium Models IV, edited by Reinhard Selten (ed.), 64–87. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Balance of Power in a Parlor Game.” In Game Equilibrium Models IV, edited by Reinhard Selten, 150–209. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1991. “Evolutorische Spieltheorie.” In Der Evolutionsgedanke in den Wissenschaften, edited by Günther Patzig, 261–278. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1992. “A Demand Commitment Model of Coalition Bargaining.” In Rational Interaction, edited by Reinhard Selten, 245–282. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1992. “John C. Harsanyi, System Builder and Conceptual Innovator.” In Rational Interaction, edited by Reinhard Selten, 419–432. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten and John P. Mayberry. 1992. “Application of Bargaining I-Games to Cold-War Competition.” In Game-Theoretic Models of Cooperation and Conflict, edited by John P. Mayberry, 133–152. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1993. “Wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Evolution.” In Makro, Geld & Institutionen, edited by Ulrich Schlieper und Dieter Schmidtchen, 38–56. Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1993. “In Search of a Better Understanding of Economic Behavior.” In Makers of Modern Economics, edited by Arnold Heertje, Makers of Modern Economics, 115–139. New York-London-Toronto-Sidney-Tokyo-Singapore: Simon and Schuster.
  • Peter Hammerstein and Reinhard Selten. 1994. “Game Theory and Evolutionary Biology.” In Handbook of Game Theory, 2, edited by R.J. Aumann and S. Hart, 929–993. Amsterdam-New York: Elsevier Science B.V.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1994. “Biographical Outline Preceding the Nobel Prize Lecture.” In LesPrix Nobel 1994, edited by Tore Fraengsmyr, 313–319. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1994. “Multistage Game Models and Delay Supergames.” In Les Prix Nobel 1994, edited by Tore Fraengsmyr, 320-348. Stockholm: Almquist & Wiksell.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1996. “Ansprache zur Ehrenpromotion an der Universität Graz.” In Grazer Universitätsreden, Graz: Verlag Jos. A. Kienreich.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1996. “Lernrichtungstheorie.” In Vortrag aus Anlaß der Ehrenpromotion an der Wirtschaftshochschule Breslau, Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej. Wroclav: Oskar Langegowe Wroclawiu.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1997. “Reexamination of the Perfectness Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games.” In Classics in Game Theory, edited by H.W. Kuhn, 317–354. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; reprinted from International Journal of Game Theory, 4, 1975, 25–55.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1997. “Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation.” In Cooperation: Game-Theoretic Approaches, edited by Sergiu Hart and Andreu Mas-Colell, NATO ASI Series, Series F: Computer and Systems Sciences, 155, 289–326. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1998. “Game Theory, Experience, Rationality.” In Game Theory, Experience, Rationality, edited by W. Leinfellner and E. Köhler, (Yearbook of Vienna Circle Institute), 9–34. Dordrecht-Boston-London: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
  • Reinhard Selten and Joachim Buchta. 1998. “Experimental Seald Bid First Price Auctions with Directly Observed Bid Functions.” In Games and Human Behavior: Essays in the Honor of Amnon Rapoport, edited by David Budescu, Ido Erev and Rami Zwick, 79–102. Mahwah NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
  • Reinhard Selten. 1999. “A Commodity Flow Model of Flexible Exchange Rates with Overshooting in Response to Inflation.” In Economics, Welfare Policy and the History of Economic Thought, edited by Martin M.G. Fase, Walter Kanning and Donald A. Walker, 15–39. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2000. “Lernrichtungstheorie.” In Innovative Kapitalanlagekonzepte, edited by Elisabeth Hehn, 11–18. Gabler Verlag.
  • Werner Güth and Reinhard Selten. 2000. “Strategic Aspects of IIASA`s Food and Agriculture Model.” In Economic Globalization, International Organizations and Crises Management, edited by Richard Tilly and Paul J.J. Welfens, 297–318. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Gerd Gigerenzer and Reinhard Selten. 2001. “Rethinking Rationality.” In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox, vol. 2, 1–12. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2001. “What is Bounded Rationality.” In Bounded Rationality: The Adaptive Toolbox , vol. 2, 13–36. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Axel Ostmann, Reinhard Selten, and Reinhard Tietz. 2001. “Imitation in a Two-Level Hexapoly.” In Advances in Behavioral Economics: Essays in Honour of Horst Todt, edited by Friedel Bolle and Michael Carlberg, 209–232. Heidelberg-New York: Physica-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2001. “Blame Avoidance as Motivating Force in the First Price Sealed Bid Private Value Auction.” In Economics Essays: A Festschrift for Werner Hildenbrand, Gérard Debreu, edited by Wilhelm Neuefeind and Walter Trockel, 333–344. Berlin-Heidelberg-New York: Springer-Verlag.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2001. “Die konzeptionellen Grundlagen der Spieltheorie einst und jetzt.” In Vadecum zu dem Klassiker der Spieltheorie, edited by Karl-Dieter Grüske, 81–101. Düsseldorf: Verlag Wirtschaft und Finanzen, Verlagsgruppe Handelsblatt GmbH.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2004. “Learning Direction Theory and Impulse Balance Equilibrium.” In Economics Lab – An intensive course in experimental Economics, edited by Daniel Friedman and Alessa Cassar, 133–140. London and New York: Routledge.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2004. “Imitation Equilibrium.” In Economics Lab – An intensive course in experimental Economics, edited by Daniel Friedman and Alessa Cassar, 141–147. London and New York, Routledge.
  • Reinhard Selten, Klaus Abbink, Bernd Irlenbusch, Bettina Rockenbach, and Abdolkarim Sadrieh. 2004. “The Behavioral Approach to the Strategic Analysis of Spectrum Auctions - The Case of the German DCS-1800 Auction.” In Spectrum Auctions and Competition in Telecommunications, edited by Gerhard Illing and Ulrich Klüh, 157–199. Cambridge (MA) and London: MIT Press.
  • Reinhard Selten, M. Schreckenberg, T. Chmura, T. Pitz, and S. Kube, S. Hafstein, R. Chrobok, A. Pottmeier, and J. Wahle. 2004. “Experimental Investigation of Day-to-Day Route Choice Behavior and Network Simulations of Autobahn-traffic in North Rhine Westphalia.” In Human Behavior and Traffic Networks, edited by Michael Schreckenberg and Reinhard Selten, 1–21. Berlin: Springer.
  • Reinhard Selten. 2004. “Boundedly Rational Qualitative Reasoning on Comparative Statics.” In Advances in Understanding Strategic Behavior, Game Theory, Experiments and Bounded Rationality, edited by Steffen Huck, 1–8. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke.

Other Publication

  • Reinhard Selten. 1996. “Ansprache des Ehrendoktors Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Reinhard Selten.” in: Grazer Universitätsreden, Ehrenpromotion des Herrn Univ.-Prof. Dr. Dr. h. c. Reinhard Selten der Universität Bonn zum Doktor der Sozial- und Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Verlag Jos. A. Kienreich, Graz, 20–28.